From 1976 through 1985, the United States Food and Drug Administration received reports of 355 fatalities associated with transfu90n. 99 of which were excluded from further review because they were unrelated to transfusion or involved hepatitis or acquired immune deficiency syndrome. Of the remaining 256 reported deaths, 51 percent resulted from acute hemolysis following the transfusion of ABO-incompatible products. These deaths were due primarily to managerial, not clerical, errors. Other causes of death (in order of frequency of report) included acute pulmonary injury (15%), bacterial contamination of product (10%). delayed hemolysis (10%), damaged product (3%), and graft-versus-host disease (0.4%). Management systems for transfusion facilities should be created or revised to include the specific identification of personnel eligible to administer transfusions. to provide written guidance and appropriate training (including recognition and management of errors), and to implement measures that target safe transfusion practices. Continued research into acute pulmonary injury, the immunologic hazards of transfusion, and the prevention of bacterial contamination of blood components is necessary. TRANSFUSION 1990; 30:583-590. , uniqul: problems for collection and transfusion selVices and arl: widl:ly rcported clscwhcre. will not~e discussed in this report. IN NOVEMBER 1975 . the Bureau of Biologics (now the Cenler for Biologics Evalualion and Research ICBER!) of Ihe Uniled Slates (US) Food and Drug Admlnislration (FDA) published regulalions requiring all rcgislered bl{)(x! establishmenls to report dealhs associalcd wilh blood colleclion or Iransfusion and wilh plasmapheresis. I This requiremenl for reporting is codified as part of the currenl Good Manufacluring Practices (GMP) regulations for blood eslablishmenls and of the producl scclion for source plasma. All registered blood eslablishments, nol only Ihose Ihat are licensed by the FDA. are required 10 comply wilh Ihis regulalion.
These reporls were e.xpertly summarized in 19801-ã nd in 19R5.~ The numher of reports availahle for analysis in Ihese four papers ranged from 7() (Ihrough 197R) to 275 (through most of 1983). The focus of each of Ihose reports was slighlly differenl. hullherc was agreemenl overall Ihat clerical error could he implicated in the majorily of fatalilies rep<)rted. This article assesses Ihe 355 reports received by Ihe FDA during Ihe firsl 10 years of mandalory reporting (1976 through 1985) . analyzing Ihem for comparabilily \vilh Ihe prcccding rep<)rts and 10 gain insight into prevenlive measures that might he imrle~enled further to reduce the number of deaths.
The pt..riod is serendipilouS. as il is stalislically manageable (a IO-year block) and includes only the very early reporls of dealhs due to acquired immune deficien~' syndrome (AIDS). AIDS deaths. which present
Materials and Methods
Thc numhcr of deaths rcported to thc FDA in each year from 11J76 through 1985 is shown in Table I , and the causes of thosc deaths arc shown in Table 2 . At thc lime of original analysis, the actual uncensored report!; wcrc rcvicwed; howevcr. all of thc background information on which this article i!i hascd can bc obtained lhrough a Frccdom of Information Act (FOrA) rcqucsl t{l the CBER.
Of thcsc 355 reported dealhs, 16 are cxcludcd fr{lm analysis t'CC3USC thcy wcrc clearly unrelated to either transfusion {lr &)nati(m (15 rcports) or hccause thc rcc{lfd could not hc hICatcd I rc!)()rt). Twclvc pcrsons who dicd during {If as a rc!iult {If hh)C)d {If pl;lsma donati<m (Table 3) are not included in the statistical analysis lhat fmlow!i.
MorcllVer, hccause lhc numt'Crs of dcath!i attribulahlc t{l hcpatitis (hepatitis B, nlln-A,non-B hepatitis, or other) (68 re-('t,rts) and I\IDS (3 rc~)rt!i) arc inconsistenl with tho!ic prcdil."!cu or rcJlllrtcd in other data basc!i. such as those maintained h" [ho: Centers for Discasc Contrm, and hccausc they arc cxt~nsivcly and cxpo:rlly summarized clscwhcrc,.lhcsc rcports arc also o:xcludcd, cxccpt for thc following t"vo observations. First, tho: 26 hcpatilis B deaths included 6 in which thc Prl)()uct was cithcr to:st ~ISilivc {If incomplctcly tested at thc lime of lransfu~ion. (Thrcc PrlJducts \vcrc properly laheled hut rclcascd in em>r. IwO Jll>sitive products were improperly labeled as ncgativc. and one pmducl had nol bccn completely restcd.) Sccond. Ihc sm;lll number of reports of posuransfusion deaths due [0 hcpatitis B suggests thaI lransfusion-associalcd dcalhs ;Ire sig.nific;lntly undcrrcportcd. For thcsc reasons, 99 of Ihe 355 re\J(>rts ro:ccived arc excluded; 2.16 remain for further rcview. Thc~c :?56 reports were categmized hy cause of death and o:x:lmincd 1(lr a numhcr of variahles including mechanism of -\.': Hmw~vzed and nondeglycerolized product TOCrc wcrc rivc dcaths in which acutc hcmolysis or the bl()()(j OCl.~rrl.'J in vitro for nonscrologic rcasons and one death due to impr<,pcr dcglyccrolization or rrozcn red cells. Thrce units "crc hcmolyzed hy blood warmcrs in which temperatures cxc '1kd 4(I"C. One unit was hemolyzed during transport ".hcn it ~~ cxp<)scd, without adequate protection, to adverse thermal extremes; the hemolysis remained undetected prior to trall"rusion. One unit was transfused with an improper intra-".CIlt'U-" S(llution, recorded as O.5N saline. The only caSt in whidl frozen red cells were not deglycerolized properly ended "ith thc death of the recipient, a lOOO-g infant. - During the IO-year replJrting pcri(Jd, 27 pcfS(Jns died of acutc hemolysis altributed to causes other Ihan asccrtainahle ABO incomPatibility. Eightccn of these deaths l!Ccurrcd whcn bl()(Jd group incompatihility was not recognized prior to transfusion (12 of these most likely were due to ABO incompatihility, but nt) cvidcncc was reported to support that conclusion). In thc other nine dealhs, antigen systems other than ABO were implicalcd: five of Ihese dcaths were due to anli-K and one each to anli-Jk", -Fy", -Jk' + Jk" + Jk3, and -E + K + p.. Thc association bclwccn these non-ABa antibodies and the death of the recipicnl is strongly suggested by unexpected acute hcmm:-'!'is thaI was evidcnl clinically and the dctcctilm of these anli~ies coincidenl with the hemolysis.
Acrlle puhnonal)' j,rjrll)' T:,c:rc were 39 dcarh~ due to acute pulmonary injury. Acurc-OI1!'Ct pulmonary edema or re~piratory in~ufficicncy \va~ thc cau!'C of 31 of thc!'C dcath~. and anaphylaxi~ wa~ implicatcd in N. In only onc ca~c of an:lphylaxi~ was an Ig/\ antilmdy of thc IgG cla~~ dcm()n~tratcd. howcvcr.
Bac/crial cOfltamino/ion of prodl/ct
Transfusion of a bactcrially contaminated pr(Jduct was rcpI}rtcd to ca~ 26 deaths. Thc rcJX}n.c; of implicated pn1((ucts were C\'cnly di\;d d t-ctwcen \vht}lc bl(x1d (including red cells) and platelets. The sin~lc reported death due to cryoprecipitate was attrihutcd to pon Ct}(1tamination during thawing in a watcrl}ath frum which P.~e/ld()fJIOllaS cepacia. the same organism rccovcrcd from the cryoprecipitate bag and the decedent's hlood, was cultured. The etiologic agents responsible for these transfusion deaths were as likely to he gram-positive as gram-negative, hut no single bacterium was found to he predominant (Table 5 ).
Discussion
It is likcly that, even when thoroughly informed prior to transfu~ion, many potcntial blood recipients may be unawarc of the ~ I percent risk of harm that transfusion itself carries. (In a recent report," the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment estimated that 5 to 18 percent of recipients of ~5 units of blood develop non-A.non-B hcpatitis.) Almost certainly, the transfused patient d()Cs not think that the transfusion itself may cause death. Ncverthelcss, even though transfusion-associated death represents a very small hazard-estimated at less than I instance pcr 100,000 transfusion recipients7-that risk a...sumes new significance in the era of transfusiontransmitted human immunode,ficiency virus, which is currently calculated to occur with a similar frequency."
The estimate of risk of fatality is derived via commonly accepted estimates of an average of 10 million units of blood collected each year and approximately 3.5 units transfused per patient each year; for the 10-year period of 1976 through 1985, a total of 100 million units of red cells wcrc transfused to 30 million patients. Of the 355 deaths reported to the FDA, at least one-half occurred aftcr transfusion of red cells, for an estimated fatality rate of approximately 0.5 to I per 100,000 pati.:nt.. tr:.lnsfuscd. Good statistical cvidcnce exists for many of the risks for transfusions,9 but the actual number of deaths that have been caused by mistakes in the administration of otherwise safe and effective blood is generally unknown and probably unknowable. The accumulated repons to the FDA that form the basis for,this summal)' provide the best information currently available from which to begin to understand the frequency and nature of errors in the administration of presumably safe products that result in fatalities.
Despite the obvious limitation that such subjective reponing creates, useful observations can be made from these death notifications. These observations may se"'e as a practical basis for the introducti<?n of new educational programs targeting the proper audience, for the audit of current transfusion practices-especially in reDclayed hemoi)'tic reactions
The 26 deaths attrinutable to delayed hemolysis pr(wide the mosl romplicated cases for analysis. Thc implicatcd antigcn sy-;lem!\. singly and in combination, plus the time from the TR~~~l-l:Sf()N y"l. "I,"" 7-1"'-1 SAZA"IA Anti-c Anti-c + E Anti-c + FyAnti-c + E + Fy-
Could not be determined from report.
. mistook a properly labeled sample for another and took tltat sample through testing and handling for the wrong patient,
. tested a properly identified sample but recorded the results on the wrong record (at the time of or subsequent to testing),
. properly performed and recorded the testing but tagged the wrong unit,
. released a properly identified unit to the wrong patient because of incorrect or absent identification, and . administered a properly identified and released unit to the wrong patient because of absent or inadequate pr!:administration checking. In some cases, there appears to be an opportunity to improve procedures to reduce these errors. Some suggestions for possible intervention and even prevention of some of the errors are presented. Honig and Bove analyzed the first 70 reports of fatalities in 19S0,:! focusing on the 44 caused by acute hr.molytic reaction. A comparison of this la-year summary witlt their 3-year analysis of errors in management (Table 7) found that the single most remarkable chang!: l)Ccurred in errors classified as "blood given to wrong person." This category represented slightly more than 38 percent (17/44) of errors in the first 3 years, but these errors increased in frequency, to 49 percent (77/]58). over the to-year period. The predominant site of error during the first 3 years of reporting was the surgical suit!: (]0/17 errors; 59%), but 52 (67.5%) of the 77 errors Juring the last 7 years of this reporting period l)Ccurred elsewhere (e.g., intensive care areas. emergency rooms, and regular patient rooms). Nurses were responsibl!:, singly (51) or with a physician (11 );. for 62 of those 77 administration errors. Physician error alone accounted for 15 of the 77 deaths. The most common site of physician error was the operating room, with th!: anesthesiologist implicated most often, a finding that is consistent ",ith an earlier report by Schmidt.4
The nature of tlte administration error in these deaths, including 10 deaths in which the intended and actual rccipients had thc same last namc and 5 in which the gard to an acute hemolytic reaction that results in deathor for the assessment of the nature and instances of bacterially contaminated products. In addition, recognition ot-the prior limitations in reporting has resulted in changes in the reporting, so that current FDA records are better standardized for collection and analysis.
The conclusion from this review, summarized concisely, is that wherever errors could bc made, errors occurred. Examples include instances when workers . failed properly to identify the recipient at thc timl: of phlebotomy, . correctly identified the patient but incorrcctly laIed the phlebotomy sample, . aliquoted a properly identified sample to an improperly labeled test tube for serologic assay, TRANSFUSION-ASS()(l,\TED OEATIIS Survival times of 1 day or more were possible because these patients were transferred quickly to intensive care areas where renal function was supported for the ensuing 2 or 3 days. However, death frequently occurred by Day 4. which seems to indicate that, even though the mistake was discovered and appropriate medical intervention initiated. survival after the transfusion was inexorai1ly sh\.)rtencd. Of course, it is not known how many patients \..ho received incompatible blood survived because of the prompt medical attention given. No obligation exists to rep\"rt "near misses" to the FDA, but each institution should maintain complete records of these errors.
Rather than simply reiterating the emphasis on clerical aspects. which may mask the true problem and perpetuate potentially correctable behavior, we can take some affinnative steps to establish the necessary procedures. Unless careful attention is paid to the causes of these errors. particularly the lack of training and written guidance ()r the failure to identify responsible persons, preventive measures may not be identified and established. Until every transfusing center has written procedures by which each transfusionist is completely trained and until each transfusionist views blood with as much caution as any deadly drug, these mistakes will likely continue.
This review of the data suggests that these management system errors, along with clerical.errors, are resptlnsii1le for the continuing and increasing percentage of fatalities due to the most common mistake, ABO incompatibility that results in acute hemolysis. Hospitalwide systems of transfusion practice, not programs targeting only the blood bank, are required. A checklist (Table 9) provides an approach to the minimization of management system error. It is clear from the IO-year perspective detailed here that there i~ an unquestioned n~ed for better training and targeted reeducation of transfusionists-not only blood bankers, but also the physiintended recipient's hospital r()()mmate rcccivcd Ihc hl(~. was a breach in idcntification or, more frequcntly, a failurl: to train the transfusionist in proper idcntification proccdures. Ordinary safeguards, such as chccking b<)th the chart and the ~ospital idcntificatilln hracclct for the name of the patient in a specific hcd and checking the hospital or blood identity number with other information and numbers and also verifying the patient's blood group and type, were ignored or overlooked. Removal of the hospital identification band during the patient's surgery may have been responsible for some of thesc errors. However, the failure remove the previous patient's reserved blood from the operating rl)()m rcfrigcrator, a factor that was implicated in scveral ABa deaths as well, is an error suggesting that no one had becn specifically dcsignated as being responsible for propcr procedure.
These findings suggcst there has heen a shift in the nature of the error leading to death. Although it is tempting to attribute all of thcse deaths to "clerical error" (meaning a failure properly to observc and record information), it appears that, in many instances, thcre was instead a management system error. This type of error includes the absence of proper writtcn procedurcs andl or training of persons held responsible for the deaths, as well as a failure properly to assign responsibility for certain aspects of transfusion (such as clearing thc operating room's blood-holding rcfrigerator between patients).
The amount of incompatible blood transfused to these patients varied from as little as 30 mL to more than 3 units of blood (Table 8 ). In the case of small-volume transfusion « 1 unit), 75 percent (8/12) of paticnts died within 24 hours. Most patients received a full unit of blood prior to the discovery of the error~ at Icast some of the patients tried to notify the nursing staff of plllcnlial danger, but this warning was frequently ignorcd. cians and nurses who actually administer the blood products. A failure to follow the neccssary procedures for transfusing blood products or a complete lack of training or knowledge of the necessary procedures contributed significantly to the deaths reported during thos1 0 years. Assuredly, no transfusing facility intends to cause a death. But the hospital that fails to manage thẽ ntire process of transfusion of blood products, including proper systems of administering blood to the correct r~-cipient, puts itself at risk of unnecessary liability. FDA regulations do not provide for the continuous surv~il-lance of institutions but rely instead on the knowledgã nd concern of health care professionals. That reli:lncm ay be misplaced when the professionals most kno\\'Iedgeable about blood do not develop and implement [hp rocess, monitor the training, and supervise the administration of this necessary but potentially deadly productManagement systems for transfusionists present an area of responsibility that is not specifically addrcssed in either the aoministrative guidelinesl11 or the standardsl! of [he American Association of Blood Banks. Other than the professionals in transfusion medicine, no scgmcnt of professional hospital staffing is bcttcr informcd and equipped to ensure that proper proccdurcs arc writtcn. reviewed, and kept current and that all persons who :ldminister blood products undergo formal and frcqu~nt training in those procedures. In any case, only a limi[~d list of persons should be trained and competent in administration of blood products. Morbidity from near misses can be better controlled and more rapid rcsponse to error effected if the team of blood transfusionists is kept small ogy and medical laboratory services (PA.6.2).12 HoweVl:r, no explicit rl:sponsibility is assignl:d to nursing serviccs for thc administration of blood products. The closest language rl:lates to medication administration (N R. 7.2.3),11 which is not necessarily interpretcd as including b({>ad products. However, assignment to the medical and pathology/clinical laboratory staffs of the responsibility for transfusing blood products begs the issue, as is exemplified by the reported fatalities. Accreditation requirements should assign the rcsponsibility for correct blood administration to the nursing services sc:ction, as blood products are virtually always transfused by nurses. This 10-year review reached only slightly different conclusions from Edinger's 7-year perspective in 1985.s HI: found 58.4 percent of all deaths to be due to hemolysis, but only 50.9 percent of deaths over the full 10-Yl:ar period fell into that general category. It is imporrant, however, to distinguish between acute and delayed sc:rologically mediated hemolyses-clinically much different cntitics-for which intervention may requirc separatc strategies. The dctection of the non-ABa all~}antihody dcveloping in a multiply transfused recipi-.:nt with a complcx medical history and multiplc-organsystem failure requires more skill and sophistication for intcrvention than is or should be necessary in the "simpll:" detcction and issuance of ABO-compatible products. Morcover, the laboratory side of transfusion mcdicine should continlic to heed the problem of clcrical error, I:vl:n though the error rate (as measured by AUO fatalitil:s) has dropped somewhat, from 36 perccnt (16/44) during thc first 3 years of reporting to 25 percent (3~/ 152) lor the entire Ill-year period.
'. In nearly all rcport., of dclayed hemolysis Icading to recipicnr dcath, multiple antibodies are presenr, wirh the implicated antil>ady/ics appcaring in a tcmporal r.:lati{ln-ship to thc recipient's dcath. These cases arc subject to differing intcrpretation by knowlcdgeable observers. This study is based on the simplistic approach of assuming that thl: delayed hemolysis was an additional insult that contrihutcd to thc ultimatc demise of the recipicnt. Othl:rs may disagree, but it should bc recalled that these reports were l~,\NSFUS'ON I~I-\"".
. '11. N". 7 589 directcd to a dcfinition of the origin and an understanding of the mechanism by which blood products are contaminated with Y. enterocolitica.2l,22 a microorganism that until very recently was unrecognized as a transfusion-transmitted contaminant.23 On the other hand. the professional lilerature is replete with reports of sepsis and morhidity due to blood products contaminated by othcr micr(){lrganisms.24-:!7 Other diseases thai are potentially transmissible by blood also remain of concern. particularly those that may create an asymptomatic bacteremic state in a donor.2I< The problem presented by Y. enterocolitica will be resolved only through appropriate research. However. the AIDS epidemic serves to remind us that. at any time. other potential pathogens may surface as problems for transfusion products. The development of means to sterilize blood prior to transfusion will contribute significantly to the containment of contamination by microorganisms. Of all the deaths reviewed. those due to acute respiratory failurc are the most enigmatic. The data available for pulmonary deaths provided very little insight into mechanisms. The implicated products and/or procedures included platelets (11 recipients). red cells (10). therapeutic exchange plasmapheresis (4), plasma products (3). \\-hite cells (2) . and whole blood (1). Because there is as yet no suitable fabricated substitute for the cellular comp<ments or for the majority of the plasma-derived blood components. and even though manufactured blood derivatives such as albumin can often be safely substituted for the raw plasma components, the need for human products will continue. Thus. deaths from acute respiratory failure will continue to provide an area for clinica! investigation. particularly in regard to the differences between survivors and nonsurvivors of acute pulmonary injury.
-
The problem of determining how many errors result in death is complicated by significant underreporting of fatalities. Two transfusion-associated deaths due to graftversus-host disease (GVHD) following cardiac surgery in immunocompetent adults were recently reported from Israel.:!" In that same publication. a letter to the editor~' estimated that. for the 5 years between 1981 and J 986. 96 of 63.257 cardiovascular surgery. patients in Japan \\rho were transfused and were immunocompetent expIo'rienced GVHD. The fatality ratc reported in those 96 I. Written policies for transfusion that specify exactly A. How to handle the unique problems of blood handling and transfusion in 1. the operating room, especially between patients; 2. the emergency room, particularly for multiple unidentified recipients; 3 the intensive care areas, emphasizing adherence to procedure even when the nursing staff is very familiar with each patient and "knows" which patient occupies each bed; 4. outpatient transfusion services. B. The person responsible from the time the product is released by the blood bank until completion of the transfusion or return of the product to the blood bank; C. Who is eligible to transfuse blood products; D Where and when transfusions may be given; E. How documentation for errors and accidents is to be maintained; F. The content and frequency of training programs for all persons who actually administer transfusions (including anesthesiologists as appropriate) and where the documentation of such training is kept; G Emergency plan; H The consequences of failure to follow the established policies and procedures; I. By whom and how often policies and procedures reviews are undertaken; and J. Outcome measures for suitable monitoring of actual practices.
II. Written procedures for bedside activities that specify A The step-by-step (read "tedious") process of administering transfusions: 1. beginning with current identification of the intended recipient compared with concurrent identification of the product and the recipient: 2. mandatory continuous patient monitoring for at least the first 10 to 20 minutes of transfusion; 3. signs and symptoms of transfusion reactions and what to do for each; and B The exact record that must be maintained; C. Whom to notify when adverse changes occur, including obligatory notification of the FDA for fatalities; D. What to do with the empty bag; E. The technical details of administration, including use (or nonuse) of filters, timing and duration of transfusions (product-dependent), what normal products look like and when to be concerned about their appearance, blood warmers, fluids that may be mixed with blood products. and so on, including what to do when the transfusion is incomplete for any reason; and F. Other details unique to each institution.
St\L\M.'\ patients was 90 percent. It is likely that similar events may be -occurring in US hospitals, particularly with the upsurge in numbers of directed donations from close family members; yet the FDA has received no re\X)rts of a GVHD death since 1976.
There is no doubt that deaths as a rcsult of transfusion are likely to continue. Human errors occur at an irreducibly small rate despite our best efforts totally to eradicate them. Tighter control over all potentially preventable cau~e~ of harm, especially errors that may cause dcath. is an ever-present and increasingly important goal for tran~fusion medicine. Reflection on past error. such as this review of fatalities, providcs a ba~is for review or establishment of appropriate prtlCedures and redirecting of research to the most compelling areas. With improved tools for data collection now in place. the FDA is also now more easily able to go beyond simply collecting information.-\ I Rather. reliable and regular reporting of transfusion fatalities and advice for improved practices derived from timely and curr\:nt revi~w should now be anticipated.
